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The importance of the agricultural sector in the economic development of India is 
clearly indicated by its contribution to the national gross domestic product (GDP). 
In 2006-07, agriculture contributed 18.5 per cent to GDP (at current prices), 
industry 26.4 per cent and services 55.1 per cent (GOI, 2008). The agricultural 
sector is also important to the socio-economic development, as about 70 per cent of 
the population live in rural areas and most of them depend on agriculture.  
 
While the economy has been growing at about 8 per cent yearly, agriculture growth 
has been dismal at nearly 2 per cent during the last ten years. This is in sharp 
contrast to the average annual growth rate of more than 4 per cent during the 80s 
and early-90s. It is this sharp decline in agricultural growth that is causing distress 
in rural areas.  
 
The current crisis has led to renewed focus on agriculture and the government has 
launched several programmes to tackle the crisis. The government has initiated 
various reforms such as agricultural market sector reforms, research and 
development, investment, formulation of integrated food laws, incentives for 
corporate investment in agribusiness sector, etc. A favourable regulatory 
environment has attracted the interest of several large corporate to agriculture. 
While earlier corporate intervention in agricultural activities was limited to agri-
input companies, the recent times have witnessed a spurt in initiatives by other 
industry players as well. These companies offer services such as extension, supply of 
inputs, market information, etc. to the farming community and commit themselves 
to purchase farm produce.  
 
Contract farming is increasingly being presented by the government as a solution to 
the problems of Indian agriculture. Private sector participation promoted through 
contract farming and land leasing arrangements will allow accelerated technology 
transfer, capital inflow and assured markets for farmers. Corporate contract 
farming has taken off in states such as Punjab, Haryana, Maharashtra and 
Gujarat. However, it is argued that only big farmers benefit from contract farming 
and under direct purchase arrangements by the private sector small and marginal 
farmers are likely to be left out. 
 
This paper discusses the role of corporate-led contract farming in transforming 
socio-economic relations in the countryside. It also investigates the determinants of 
participation of farmers in contract farming and the effects of participation on crop 
productivity and farm income. 
 
Contract Farming in India 
 
There is a perception that because of market liberalization, globalization, and 
expanding agribusiness, small farmers will find difficulty in participating in 
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restructured markets and could become marginalized. One of the reasons for their 
exclusion is weak backward (inputs and services) and forward (agro-processing and 
marketing) market linkages. Farmers have poor access to reliable and cost-efficient 
inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, credit, extension services, and assured and 
profitable markets for their output. Well-organized contract farming is expected to 
provide such linkages, and would appear to offer an important way in which small 
farmers can be linked to the market. Through contract farming, agribusiness 
companies can assist smallholders to shift from subsistence or traditional 
agriculture to the production of high-value/export-orientated products. This not only 
has a potential to increase incomes of smallholders but also to have multiplier 
effects in the economy.  
 
Contract farming can be defined as an agreement between a farmer and processing 
and/or marketing firm for the production and supply of agricultural products under 
forward agreements, frequently at predetermined prices (Charles and Shepherd, 
2001). The arrangement also invariably involves the purchaser in providing a 
degree of production support through, for example, supply of inputs and provision of 
technical advice. The basis of such arrangements is a commitment by the farmer to 
provide a specific commodity in quantities and on quality standards determined by 
the purchaser and a commitment by the company to support the farmer’s 
production and to purchase the commodity. Contract farming is an intermediate 
production and marketing system that spreads production and marketing risks 
between agribusiness and smallholders. Similarly, it also provides agribusiness 
companies with the opportunity to guarantee a reliable source of supplies of 
required quantity and quality. It can be regarded as a means of reducing high 
transaction costs that result from the failure of the market and/or government to 
provide required inputs and market institutions. 
 
The intensity of the contractual arrangement varies according to the depth and 
complexity of the provisions in each of the following three areas (Charles and 
Shepherd (2001) : 
 
 Market  provision: The grower and buyer agree to terms and conditions for 
  future sale and purchase of a crop or livestock product 
  
  Resource provision: In conjunction with marketing arrangements the buyer 
  agrees to supply selected inputs, including on occasions land preparation and 
 technical  advice 
 
  Management specifications: The grower agrees to follow recommended 
  production methods, inputs regimes, and cultivation and harvesting 
 specifications. 
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Contract farming emerged as an important phenomenon in developed countries 
during the 50s and 60s. By 1980, about one-third of total US farm output, and as 
much as 100 per cent of poultry meat, milk, and certain vegetables, were produced 
under contracts (Little and Watts, 1994). In developing countries, multi-national 
corporations introduced contract farming during the late 70s and early 80s. 
Contract farming in India is not a new phenomenon as informal contract farming 
has been practised by cooperatives in some commodities like milk and sugarcane for 
quite some time. However, corporate-led contract farming system in India is a 
recent phenomenon. 
 
Until recently, there were several restrictions on participation of the corporate 
sector in agriculture and all related activities. The Essential Commodities Act 
(ECA) of 1955 restricted trade in food products to licensed traders, and defined 
limits on stock holding. Food processing was reserved for the small-scale sector. 
Most importantly, the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee (APMC) Act 
required that farm produce be sold only at designated government markets through 
registered intermediaries. Under the Act, the private sector was not allowed to buy 
directly from farmers. Farmers were also restricted from entering into direct 
contract with any buyer because the produce was required to be channelized 
through regulated markets. These restrictions acted as disincentive to farmers, 
trade, and industries. The Central government, therefore, drafted a model APMC 
Act (since agriculture falls under the jurisdiction of state governments) in 2002, 
which allowed private players to set up markets not regulated by the market 
committees. The model APMC Act provides an institutional framework to support 
contract farming and direct marketing which would link small farmers to the agro-
processing industry and provide them an access to better technology, extension 
services, seeds, credit, and market linkages., Several state governments have 
already initiated steps to amend the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee 
(APMC) Act. Punjab, a leading agricultural state, was one of the first to amend the 
APMC Act. 
 
The first contract farming initiative in India was taken by Pepsi Foods Ltd 
(PepsiCo) in 1989 which set up tomato processing plant in Punjab. With the 
liberalization of the economy in the 90s, there has been a spurt in contract farming 
in India.  Contract farming is practised by domestic and multi-national corporations 
in foodgrains, spices, oilseeds, fruits and vegetable crops, cotton, tea, coffee, etc. 
Financial institutions and banks are also promoting contract farming.  
Different contract models are available to farmers and agribusiness ranging from 
simple buyback of produce to provision of inputs and services; single company model 
to consortium of companies (agri-input, processing, banks, etc.) including statal and 
parastatal agencies. The partnership will depend on the available institutions to 
support production and product markets, commodity being produced, resource base 
of producers and capacity of agribusiness firms. Important contract farming models 
being practised in India are presented in Figures 1-4.  
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Figure 1. Bipartite Agreement between Farmer and Company/Statal/Parastatal 
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Figure 3. Quad-partite Agreement between Farmer, Input Supplier, Agro-
processing Company and Statal/Parastatal agency 
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Figure 4. Quad-partite Agreement between Farmer, Agro-processing/Marketing 
Company, Agri-Input Company and Bank 
 
India’s Agricultural Sector Crisis 
 
This section discusses deceleration in the agricultural sector, declining investment, 
deteriorating institutions mainly extension agencies, and ecological crisis in Indian 
agriculture. 
 
Deceleration in Agricultural Sector 
 
While India’s GDP grew at an annual compound growth rate of 7.6 per cent during 
the tenth plan2 (at 1993-94 constant prices), agricultural growth declined to nearly 
2 per cent, resulting from stagnation or decline in productivity.  Plan-wise trends of 
growth of GDP and agriculture show that India’s agricultural sector has grown 
more than targeted growth during the sixth, seventh, and eighth plans but fell short 
                                                           
2 After independence, India opted for a centrally planned economy to achieve an effective and 
equitable allocation of resources and balanced economic development. In order to achieve these 
objectives the Planning Commission, headed by the Prime Minister of India as its chairperson, was 
set up in 1950 and given the responsibility of formulation and direction of the five-year plans. Five 
year plans build a long term strategic vision of the future, decide on national priorities, work out 
sectoral targets, and provide promotional stimulus to the economy to grow in the desired direction. 
The First Five-year Plan was launched in 1951 and currently eleventh plan (2007-2012) is in 
progress. The content and the strategy of successive five-year plans have varied in response to 
development issues being addressed. 
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of the target during the ninth and tenth plans. During the tenth plan, agricultural 
GDP grew at an annual rate of mere 2.1 per cent against the target rate of 4 per 
cent (Figure 5).  Considering the importance of agriculture in the Indian economy, it 
would be difficult to imagine India meeting the targeted growth of 9 per cent during 
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Figure 5. Plan-wise Trend of Growth of GDP and Agriculture GDP including Allied 
Sectors (at 1993-94 constant prices) 
Source: GOI (2006) 
 
 
Declining Investment and Rising Subsidies 
 
One of the important reasons for deceleration in agricultural growth has been 
declining levels of investment in agriculture and allied sectors, particularly public 
investment.  The share of agriculture and irrigation in plan expenditure has 
declined from 37.3 per cent in first plan to 10.6 per cent in the tenth plan (Figure 6). 
The share of the public sector in gross capital formation in agriculture has declined 
from 30.9 per cent in 1995-96 to 25.6 per cent in 2003-04, while the share of the 
private sector has increased from 69.1 per cent to 74.4 per cent during the same 
period (Sharma, 2007). The share of agriculture sector’s capital formation in GDP 
has declined from 1.9 per cent in the early 90s to about 1.2 in the early 2000s, which 
is a cause for concern.  However, there is an indication of reversal of this trend of 
late, with public sector investment in agriculture reaching the highest level since 
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the early 90s at Rs. 5,249 crore3  in 2003-04 at 1993-94 prices (GoI, 2007). This has 
helped in improving the share of agriculture sector’s capital formation in GDP from 
1.28 per cent in 2001-02 to 1.31 per cent in 2003-04.  
 
A key reason for declining public investment in agriculture has been ever increasing 
agricultural subsidies. Total agricultural subsidies have increased at an annual 
compound growth rate of about 12 per cent between 1993-94 and 2002-03. Trends in 
food and fertilizer subsidies during the 1990s and 2000s are presented in Figure 7. 
Subsidy on fertilizers has increased from Rs. 4389 crore in 1990-91 to about Rs. 
22,452 crore in 2006-07 (at an annual compound growth rate of 10.6 per cent).  Food 
subsidies have also witnessed a significant growth during the 1990s and 2000s, 
rising from Rs. 2450 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 24,200 crore in 2006-07.  Food and 
agricultural subsidies are far greater than public investment in agriculture and 
allied sectors.  In addition there has been deterioration in quality of 
institutions/organizations providing inputs and services such as credit, seeds, 
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Figure 6. Share of Agriculture and allied Sectors, and Irrigation in Total Plan 
Expenditure during Plan Periods 
Source: GOI (2001) 
 
                                                           
3 1 crore = 10 million; 1 US$ (as on June 8, 2008) = Rs. 42.79  
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Figure 7. Trends in Food and Fertilizer Subsidies in India 
Source: CSO (2008); GOI (2008) 
 
 
To boost growth rates in agriculture, India needs massive investments in 
agriculture, particularly public investment. There is ample evidence to suggest that 
returns on input subsidies are typically lower than returns on investments in public 
goods. Investment in public goods such as agricultural research and extension, rural 
roads, and irrigation typically produce returns two to six times greater than 
spending on input subsidies (Fan, Zhang and Zhang, 2003; Fan, Hazell and Thorat, 
1999, Fan, Zhang and Rao, 2004). Therefore, a reorientation of public spending from 
input subsidies and increased investment in public goods is likely to accelerate 
agricultural growth. Many of the key investments required to accelerate 
agricultural growth – technological research, rural infrastructure, etc. - are public 
goods. Because the private sector cannot capture gains from these investments, they 
will not invest in amounts sufficient to ensure broad-based agricultural growth. 
Therefore, public sector needs to provide the necessary technological, institutional, 
and rural infrastructure to stimulate agricultural growth. But public investments in 
agriculture have been stagnating or falling over years, while the subsidy bill on 
food, fertilizer, power and irrigation has been ballooning. If Indian policy planners 
can reverse this trend, much of the problems of Indian agriculture will solve 
themselves.  
 
The government is aware of the problem of misdirected and unsustainable 
subsidies. In its approach paper to the mid-term appraisal of the tenth plan (2002–
07), the Planning Commission has indicated that the existing farm price support 
and procurement policies combined with input subsidies on fertilizer, irrigation, etc. 
have led to a sharp increase in subsidy based support while public investment in 
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agriculture has suffered. The outcome is inequitable since subsidies typically go to 
riche farmers in irrigated areas, while lack of public investment hurts poorer 
farmers and those in arid regions. However, agricultural subsidies are a politically 
complex and sensitive subject. The logic that the present subsidy regime benefits 
better-off farmers disproportionately has failed to carry much political weight. It is 
also true that even small and medium farmers depend crucially on subsidized 
inputs such as seeds, fertilizer, irrigation, etc. Attacking subsidies, therefore, 
translates politically into a direct attack on all farmers’ interests. 
 
Declining Farm Size and Land Fragmentation 
 
The agrarian structure in India has undergone significant structural 
transformation since the 70s. Recent data show that the share of marginal and 
small farmers (farmers owning <2 ha) has increased from 69.7 per cent in 1970-71 
to approximately 82 per cent in 2000-01 (GOI, 2007).  The average farm size has 
declined from 2.3 ha in 1970-71 to 1.69 ha in 2000-01. The average size of land 
holdings in India is not only very small but is subject to fragmentation owing to 
imposition of ceilings on land holding, population increase, inheritance laws which 
have stipulated an equal division of property among sons, lack of off-farm 
occupations, etc. Such small holdings are often overmanned, resulting in disguised 
unemployment and low productivity of labour. Moreover, there are several tenancy 
restrictions in many states, ranging from a complete ban of leasing in some states to 
complete freedom in some states. There is growing consensus about the need to 
have a relook at current tenancy legislations, which sometimes restrict 
participation of the private sector in agriculture. However, under the Indian 
constitution, land administration falls under state governments and reforms at the 
state level are most difficult to bring about.    
 
Dominance of Rice-Wheat Cropping System and Stagnant Productivity Levels 
 
Foodgrains continue to occupy an important place in Indian agriculture. 
Commercial crops such as fruits and vegetables, fibres, condiments and spices, etc. 
have reported significant increase at the national level during the last decade. The 
share of foodgrains in the cropped area has declined from about 77 per cent in 1971-
72 to about 65.6 per cent in 2001-02.  Area under rice has remained almost constant 
at about 23 per cent while area under wheat has increased from 11.5 per cent to 14 
per cent of the cropped area. However area under coarse cereals declined 
significantly from about 27 per cent in 1971-72 to 16 per cent in 2001-02.  Area 
under pulses has also declined from 13.3 per cent to nearly 12 per cent.   
In agriculturally developed states like Punjab and Haryana, the rice-wheat mono-
cropping system is predominant. Rice and wheat account for more than three-fourth 
of the cropped area in Punjab. Share of rice and wheat in the cropped area have 
increased in recent years. The reasons for this increase are steady increase in 
minimum support prices (MSP) of wheat and rice and assured procurement by the 
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government. MSP of wheat has increased from Rs. 280 per quintal in 1991-92 to Rs. 
1000 per quintal in 2007-08 and in the case of rice it has increased from Rs. 230 to 




Figure 8. Minimum Support Prices of Wheat and Paddy in India 
Source: GOI (2007) 
 
 
Another major problem is of stagnant rate of growth in agricultural productivity. As 
shown in Figure 9, productivity of wheat, coarse cereals, pulses and oilseeds has 




States like Punjab and Haryana that spearheaded the Green Revolution in the 60s 
and 70s are facing a major crisis on the agricultural front. Because of the high 
yielding varieties (HYVs) of seeds during the green revolution period and assured 
market and price for marketable surplus, rice-wheat crop rotation became 
dominant. HYVs require assured supplied of water and large amounts of chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides, which have long-term ecological consequences. About 73 
per cent of irrigation in the Punjab is from tubewells and the remaining from 
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Figure 9. Growth Rates of Productivity of Principal Crops in India 
Source: Computed from GOI (2007) 
 
 
government canals. With rice being heavily water dependant, farmers have every 
reason to over-exploit groundwater. The inevitability of groundwater extraction has 
been politically exploited too. Successive governments have even given free 
electricity to farmers in the state. Water tables have fallen at alarming rates in 
many places in the state during the last few decades. The government’s policy of 
providing free electricity for agriculture and very low water charges for canal water 
have encouraged inefficient use of irrigation water.  Intensive use of tubewell 
irrigation has led to depletion of water resources in the state. About 98 per cent of 
groundwater resources in Punjab have already been exploited. Nearly 59 per cent of 
development blocks have overexploited groundwater resources, the highest rate in 
the country, and another 12 per cent are in dark/critical zone. Injudicious use of 
canal-irrigation water without regard to soil conditions and inadequate attention to 
drainage have led to water-logging and salinity in many areas, resulting in valuable 
agricultural land going out of use. 
 
 
High and Imbalanced Use of Chemical Fertilizers 
 
There has been a substantial increase in fertilizer consumption in the country. Total 
NPK (N, P2O5 and K2O) consumption has increased from 0.7 lakh tonnes in 1950-51 
to 22 million tonnes in 2006-07. Per hectare consumption of fertilizers, which was 
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less than one kg in 1951-52 has increased to about 113 kg in 2006-07 (FAI, 2007). In 
addition, overuse of nitrogenous fertilizers because of higher amounts of subsidy on 
urea has led to imbalanced use of fertilizers. The N:P2O5:K2O ratio  in Punjab and 
Haryana (agriculturally the most progressive states) is one of the most distorted at 
20:6:1 and 30:9:1, respectively as against the generally recommended 4:2:1 (FAI, 
2007). In short, intensive use of inputs mainly irrigation water and chemical 
fertilizers, which was central to the green revolution, has created an ecological crisis 
in the some states.  If remedial action is not taken, the ecological crisis is bound to 
worsen. 
 
Contract Farming Initiatives to Address Agrarian and Ecological Crisis in Punjab  
 
Concerns about the crisis in Indian agriculture and ecological problems were 
expressed way back in early 90s. Some state governments and the central 
government initiated reforms like involvement of the corporate sector in agriculture 
through contract farming for better access to inputs, extension services, and credit 
from agribusiness companies; diversification towards high-value agriculture, and 
assured markets. Contract farming is also supposed to eliminate and/or reduce 
market and price risks, which farmers face.  However, it all depends on the nature 
of contracts, legislation for regulation of contract farming, enforcement, dispute 
resolution mechanisms, etc. Punjab is one of the states to introduce contract 
farming to promote diversification of agriculture, risk management, and address the 
larger issue of agrarian crisis. The Punjab Agro Foodgrains Corporation (a 
government parastatal) has been helping in diversifying agriculture through 
promotion of contract farming in the state. This was facilitated by the state 
government’s incentives such as reduction and/or waiver of certain usually 
mandatory charges like market fee and rural development cess associated with 
procurement of agricultural commodities. Pepsico was the first company to start 
informal contract farming with basmati rice in 1998, followed by Hindustan Lever 
(HLL) in 2000. At present, several companies are involved in contract farming in 
the state. This paper is an attempt to understand the socio-economic implications of 




The study was conducted in three districts of Punjab, Amritsar, Jalandhar and 
Ludhiana. Initially 150 farmers were selected through stratified random sampling 
but finally 127 farmers (87 contract farmers and 40 non-contract farmers) formed 
the sample since 23 households provide incomplete information on most of the 
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In this section we wish to explain determinants of participation in contract farming, 
and whether participation in contract farming scheme affects farm income. To 
explain these relationships, we have to account for unobserved factors that may 
affect both likelihood of participation and farm income. We do this by applying a 
two-stage Heckman model (1979) to produce statistically unbiased estimates of 
programme impacts. Two equations estimate the impacts of farmers’ characteristics 
on decisions to participate in contract farming programme. We use this information 
to produce a statistically unbiased estimate of the impact of program participation 
on farm incomes. In the first stage a probit model, which is a choice model where 
the dependant variable is a binary variable (zero [0] or one [1] type of response) is 
used. This model is estimated using probit model to evaluate the determinants of 
farmers’ participation in contract farming. The second stage model uses ordinary 
least squares (OLS) method for estimating the impact of contract farming on farm 
income. The first stage model is specified as: 
 
Zi = α0 + α1 AGE +α 2 EDUCATION + α3 Farm Size + α4 CREDIT + α5 EXTENSION 
+ α6 MEMBERSHIP + α7 OFF-FARM INCOME + εi   
    ( 1 )  
Zi is equal to 1 if the respondent is a contract farmer, 0 otherwise. Equation (1) is 
estimated using a bivariate probit model. After estimating equation (1), an inverse 
of the mills ratio (IMR) is computed for each observation and included as an 
independent variable in the second stage model. 
 
The second stage model is: 
 
Yi = β0 + β1 AGE + β2 EDUCATION + β3 Farm Size + β4 CREDIT + β5 EXTENSION 
+ β6 MEMBERSHIP + β7 OFF-FARM INCOME + β7 IMR + uij      (2) 
 
Farm income Yij is hypothesized to be affected by farmer’s participation in contract 
farming and βis are the estimation parameters. We estimate the model using OLS. 
Based on the theoretical framework and previous research, several hypotheses are 
formulated. Household heads who are younger are hypothesized to be more likely to 
participate in contract farming. Education is expected to have a positive effect on 
the likelihood of participation in contract farming and farm income. Households 
with more assets such as land are expected to be more likely to be part of contract 
farming initiatives. Those who have better access to institutional credit, extension 
services, off-farm income and are members of farmers’ groups/cooperatives, etc. are 
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Results and Discussion 
 
The following discussion is focused on identifying and comparing factors that can be 
used to explain differences in participation in contract farming. Results for 
participants of contract farming are compared with non-participant farmers. 
 
Socio-economic Characteristics of Sample Households 
 
Table 1 shows demographic and socio-economic characteristics of sample 
households. Almost all households in the sample were male-headed with an average 
family size of six members per household under contract farming and nine members 
in the case of non-contract households. Contract farming farmers were more 
educated, had larger farm size, and were young compared to non-participants. Crop 
farming is a main occupation for almost all contract and non-contract farmers. 
Dairy farming is a subsidiary occupation for more than 80 per cent of households.  
 
The average size of operational holdings was higher (10.3 hectares) in the case of 
contract farmers than non-contract farmers (4.8 hectares). Tenancy is allowed in the 
state, therefore, leasing of land is quite common. The average area under lease is 
higher in case of the contract farmers than non-contract farmers.  Area under lease 
has increased from 2.3 hectares in 2002 to 4.3 hectares in 2007 in the case of 
contract farmers; while the corresponding figures for non-contract farmers are 1.4 
and 2.2 hectares. Largely medium and large farmers lease-in land to increase their 
operational holding to enter into contract farming, since most companies prefer 
large landholdings. Fixed rent and payment in cash are dominant practices. The 





Farmers grow a variety of crops in the study area but rice (basmati and non-
basmati) is the main crop occupying 41 per cent of the gross cropped area during 
summer and wheat (34.9%) in winter, accounting for over three-quarters of the 
cropped area. Area under basmati rice has increased between 2002 and 2007, 
whereas, area under non-basmati rice has declined during the same period. 
The cropping pattern of non-contract farms is also dominated by rice (36 per cent) in 
summer and wheat (42 per cent) in winter season. It is interesting to note that area 
under basmati rice is significantly higher (23 per cent) in the case of contract 
framers than non-contract farmers (8%).  In contrast, area under non-basmati rice 
is higher (28%) in non-contract farmers compared to contract farmers. It is evident 
that there is shift in area from water-intensive non-basmati rice to less water 
intensive basmati rice by both contract and non-contract farmers. However, this 
shift is more pronounced in the case of contract farmers than non-contract framers.  
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These results clearly show the impact of government efforts to shift area from 
water-intensive non-basmati rice to less water intensive basmati.  
 
Table 1. Socio-economic Characteristics of Contract and Non-contract Farmers\ 
  Contract farmers  Non-Contract farmers 
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Subsidiary 
                       Dairy 

























Figures in parentheses show standard deviations 
 
 
Impacts of Contract Farming on Crop Productivity 
 
Contract farming has been used to promote new high-value crops, which are more 
input intensive, risky, and market dependent for profitability, to lower costs either  
by yield improvement or cutting input costs through better quality inputs and 
services, and to raise returns by value addition to primary produce. In order to 
examine impact of contract farming on yields, we compared productivity levels of 
major crops such as rice (basmati and non-basmati) and wheat between 2002 and 
2007 on contract farms as well as between contract and non-contract households in 
2007. 
 
Per hectare productivity of basmati rice under contract farming showed an increase 
of about 19 per cent (3.8 tonnes in 2007 against 3.2 tonnes in 2002), followed by 
non-basmati rice (10 per cent increase). Wheat productivity declined from 4.5 
tonnes per ha in 2002 to 4.2 tonnes in 2007, which is consistent with state level 
productivity trends (Figure 10). Because of improvement in crop productivity, area 
under basmati increased over the years.   
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A comparison of productivity levels between contract and non-contract farmers 
shows that the average yield of rice (basmati and non-basmati) is higher in the case 
of contract farmers (Figure 11). Basmati rice yield is about 23 per cent higher in the 
case of contract farmers than non-contract farmers. Important reasons for higher 
yield include better quality seeds, appropriate crop management practices 
introduced by sponsors, and close monitoring of the crop at all stages. The average 
cost of production is higher on contract farms than non-contract farms but increased 
costs are compensated by higher yields. Net income per hectare is higher on 
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Figure 10. Trends in per hectare Productivity of Rice and Wheat on Contract Farms 
 
 
Perceived Benefits of and Constraints in Contract Farming 
 
Selected households were asked to list reasons for adopting contract farming and 
the results are presented in Table 2.  Although producers participate in contract 
farming for many reasons, access to assured market was the most opted reason with 
76 per cent respondents. Assured price was another reason for adopting contract 
farming in the case of about two-thirds of the respondents. This shows that farmers 
prefer assured market to assured price. Some companies offer a floor/minimum 
price in the agreement and final price is decided based on market conditions, while 
in some cases companies announce a pre-decided price. However, under both 
conditions, farmer is free to sell in the market if market price is higher than sponsor 
price. Some estimates indicate that more than half of farmers honour the 
agreement and sell to the company. Other reasons for contract farming include 
higher returns compared with competing crops, less water requirement of basmati 
rice, inspiration from fellow farmers who had adopted contract farming, and 
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personal relations with the company.  Access to better seed and extension services 















Basmati rice Non-basmati rice Wheat
Contract Farmer Non-contract Farmer
 
 
Figure 11. Productivity of Rice and Wheat on Contract and Non-Contract Farms 
 
 
It is also important to understand the downside to contract farming.  Some farmers 
have discontinued contract farming or changed the company.  Majority of farmers 
identified stringent quality control provisions by the company to be the most  
problematic since they were accustomed to quality checks by private traders and/or 
Food Corporation of India (government parastatal), whose quality standards were 
not very stringent.  Most companies engaged in contract farming are export-
oriented, therefore, emphasize on quality.  The rejection rate was quite high in some 
cases and that was one of the reasons for discontinuing contract farming.  Some 
companies paid a marginally lower price than market price because they provided 
better extension services, seeds, and other inputs, which improved farm 
productivity, thereby enabling the farmer get higher net income. However, the 
farmers could not appreciate the increase in net income owing to better quality 
seeds, and better extension services; they were driven more by price and 
discontinued contract farming. Some farmers reported other reasons such as 
distance of sales/delivery point from farm and delay in payments for discontinuing 
contract farming. However, failure to meet quality standards turned out to be the 
most important reason for discontinuing contract farming. Therefore, farmers 
should be trained to improve agricultural practices to improve standards and thus, 
meet buyers’ expectations. 
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Non-contracting farmers cited small size of holding to be the major constraint to 
enter into contract farming because companies prefer large farmers.  In some cases 
market prices were marginally higher or at par with contract prices, so farmers did 
not find it beneficial to enter into contract farming. Public good nature of extension 
services/knowledge was also mentioned as one of the reasons for not adopting 
contract farming.  Other reasons were reluctance on the part of farmers to share 
information about land with private companies, uncertainty about company policies 
and lack of provision of credit by agribusiness companies. 
 
Table 2. Perceived Benefits of Contract Farming as Reported by Respondents 
Reasons Percent  of 
respondents 
Access to assured market  76 
Assured price   67 
Access to better seed  50 
Access to better extension services  42 
Less water requirement   26 
Higher returns than competing crops  18 
Inspired by other contract farmers   15 
Less incidence of crop diseases  10 
Personal relations  8 
Factors influencing Farmers’ Participation in Contract Farming: Probit Analysis 
 
 
The results of probit analysis were obtained to examine the probability of 
participation in contract farming and provide the inverse mill’s ratio for the second 
stage analysis (Table 3). As hypothesized, farm size, human capital, and credit 
constraints were related to the likelihood of being a participant in contract farming. 
The positive and significant coefficient of farm size indicates positive influence on 
participation in contract farming. Small farmers are highly risk averse because of 
limited holdings, moreover, firms are also not interested in having contracts with 
small farmers because of high transaction costs. The positively significant 
coefficient of credit implies that availability of institutional credit encourages 
farmers to participate in contract farming as they are less dependent on informal 
sources, mainly money lenders, for credit requirements. Small farmers are forced to 
sell their produce to traders who finance credit requirements. Age and age squared 
were tried to measure a possible curvilinear effect on participation in contract 
farming but did not change the results so age variable was included in the final 
analysis. The coefficient of age was negatively significant, which implies that older 
the farmers, lesser the probability of participation in contract farming. It means 
that risk aversion increases with increase in age and experience.  
 
The coefficient of years of schooling was positively significant, which implies that 
participation in contract farming goes up with increase in years of schooling. The 
coefficient of education was expected to decrease risk aversion behaviour and 
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increase participation in contract farming. The coefficient of off-farm income was 
found positively significant, which implies that it widens the possibility of 
participation in new models/innovations by mitigating the shortage of capital. 
Households without off-farm income are likely to be highly risk averse. The 
coefficient of extension service by public agencies was found to be non-significant, 
which implies that public extension system is not very effective. Membership in 
farmers’ group/association /cooperatives significantly determines participation in 
contract farming. Membership is positively related to participation; if a farmer is a 
member of farmers’ group/association/cooperatives, he/she is likely to participate in 
contract farming. It is also known that collective action enables small farmers to 
attain better bargaining power, economies of scale and reduce transaction costs.  
 
Table 3. Probit Estimation of Factors affecting Participation in Contract Farming 
and Farm Income 
Parameter estimates 
1st Stage: Participation@ 2 nd Stage: Farm Income 
 
Explanatory variables 
Coefficient        Std.  Error Coefficient Std.  Error
Constant 0.0759  0.8531  7234.96  1456.65 
Age of the farmer (years)  -0.0512*** 0.0198  11.21  33.98 
Education of the farmer (years of 
schooling) 
0.1273** 0.0562  427.35*** 89.15 
Farm Size (ha)  0.0743* 0.0452 35.08  46.43 
Access to institutional credit (1 = 
yes; 0 = No) 
0.5412* 0.3075  1653.45** 646.95 
Access to extension services (1 = 
yes; 0 = No) 
0.1036 0.0519  1147.91* 695.98 
Membership to an organization (1 
= yes; 0 = No) 
0.8090*** 0.3048 -563.30  603.52 
Source of off-farm income (1 = yes; 
0 = No) 
0.7708* 0.4086 501.35 620.92 
Lambda (Inverse Mills Ratio)  -  -  109.67** 41.59 
Number of observations  127  -  -  - 
Chi2 55.20  -  -  - 
Probability > Chi2 0.0000  -  -  - 
F (8, 118)  -  -  8.85  - 
Probability > F  -  -  0.0000  - 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -51.52  -  -  - 
R2 -  -  0.38  - 
@ Probit equation for participation in contract farming, 1 if participant, 0 otherwise 
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Impact of Participation in Contract Farming on Farm Income 
 
Table 3 also provides second-stage impact results using gross farm income as the 
dependent variable. Ideally, our dependent variable should be net income. 
Unfortunately, accurate data on the value of some of inputs are difficult to obtain. 
This is particularly true for inputs for which markets are not well developed. 
Therefore, we have use gross income per hectare per household as the dependent 
variable in the second stage of regression.  
 
The second stage is corrected for sample selection bias. The inverse mill’s ratio, 
lambda, corrects the error terms in the impact equations to achieve consistent and 
unbiased estimates. Lambda is the expected value of the residuals that are 
truncated at the second stage OLS. The coefficient estimates in the second stage are 
used to determine whether and how household characteristics, farm size, and other 
factors affect farm income.  
 
The second stage results support two conclusions. First, the Heckman selection 
model used in this study is systematically related to the variables, showing a 
statistically significant coefficient. Second, many of the variables are statistically 
significant with coefficient signs consistent with expectations. However, the factors 
that are statistically significant are not the same as those in the first stage 
suggesting that there are differences in the determinants of being contract farmers 
and farm income. 
 
The results indicate that education has a statistically significant and positive 
impact on farm income, which supports our hypothesis. Contract farming firms 
demand minimum quality standards from producers while traditional channels are 
not so strict about quality issues. Educated producers are more capable of meeting 
these standards. Farmers with better access to institutional credit and better 
extension services are likely to have higher income.  
 
Concluding Observations  
 
Agriculture is and will remain the mainstay for a large part of the rural population 
in India in the coming years. Promoting more rapid and broad-based agricultural 
growth, particularly achieving 4 per cent agricultural growth not only in the 
eleventh plan but for medium to longer term, will be extremely important not only 
for achieving higher economic growth but also for alleviating poverty in rural areas. 
Most farmers are small and marginal, who have poor linkages with markets and 
who have low risk-bearing capacity restricting their participation in fast changing 
dynamic markets. Corporate agriculture, especially through contract farming, is 
being promoted by central as well as state governments as a part of the strategy to 
solve some of these problems. Contract farming is expected to enable farmers to 
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access better quality inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, extension services, 
and credit from the corporate sector. Contract farming has also potential to 
eliminate and/or reduce market and price risks, which farmers face.  However, it all 
depends on the nature of contracts, legislation for regulation of contract farming, 
enforcement, dispute resolution mechanisms, role of government, etc.  
 
The conclusions from this study have wider significance in connection with the 
question of how successful approaches to contract farming can be developed. First, 
there is a need to assist farmers to have better education, access to timely and 
quality inputs such as extension services, institutional credit, and better 
opportunities of off-farm income to improve financial status. The results have 
shown that membership to farmers’ organization was positively related to the 
likelihood of being a contract farmer. Thus, there is a need to promote non-political 
farmers’ organizations to improve smallholders’ bargaining power as well as reduce 
transaction costs to agribusiness companies.    
   
Second, it is important to provide an integrated set of services including credit and 
not just extension services and seed as is being done. In order to provide these 
inputs and services, partnership between public and private sector companies is 
needed. Collaboration between public and private sectors for providing extension 
services can take place easily. Government should initiate amendments in legal and 
regulatory frameworks in input and output markets, land market policies, etc. to 
promote private sector participation in agriculture.  
 
Finally, small farmers will be able to participate in the changing markets effectively 
and establish links with new market chains (supermarkets, agribusiness 
companies, processors, exporters, etc.) only if they have access to better 
infrastructure, inputs and services, and are better organized. Policy makers can 
support farmers through provision of required infrastructure and technology, timely 
information, extension services, enabling policy environment, and promoting public-
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